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THE ROLE OF METROPOLES:
Neglected Elements in Interpreting
Globalization in Central Europe
v

Jirí Musil

I. Introduction
In most analyses of the post-1989 processes of globalization and
societal transformation in the countries of Central Europe, stress
is placed primarily on the systemic changes in the economy,
political systems, and social structure. Less attention is given to
the instruments of globalization and social change. Among the
neglected mechanisms are two apparently unrelated phenomena: the functioning of large cities and the new communication
technologies. Such neglect is surprising in view of the knowledge available about the role of cities in diffusion processes and
of information theory studies on cities as “senders” and
“receivers.”
This paper is an attempt to conceptualize the role of large
cities, especially Central European metropoles, in integrating
postcommunist countries with the rest of the world and with
Western Europe, in particular. Attention will also be given to the
diffusion of communication technologies that make such an
integration easier and quicker.
Globalization is undoubtedly one of the most important
processes transforming our present world. One should not forget, however, that interactions, linkages, and contacts between
metropoles existed in the past as well. The relatively quick diffusion of knowledge, ideas, and styles in art and architecture on
the European continent proves that in the past the centers of
thought, knowledge, and style formation were always in lively
contact. Globalization is a higher and more intensive level of
134
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such contacts and interlinkages. It is based on extensive competition and cooperation, on exchange of information, and, principally, on a growing division of labor between metropoles. The
urban centers within the continents are becoming more and
more one system, with regularly and intensively interacting
metropoles and large cities. Two to three decades ago, the highest levels of continental urban systems began to integrate into a
network, or quasi system, of global cities. London, New York,
Tokyo, Paris, and Frankfurt now function as an interconnected
global financial market. Similar global systems are emerging in
some areas of science. A conditio sine qua non of such functional,
quick, and reliable interaction between metropoles and centers
of knowledge, which knit together the continental as well as the
global urban systems, is the existence of new communication
technologies and their rapid spread around the world, even in
poor countries. As expressed by Manuel Castells, poverty is not
a big obstacle in the diffusion of new communication technologies.
At the same time, it should be stressed that societal changes
after 1989 (i.e., changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural systems) in the respective countries, as well as the introduction of new communication technologies, did not start in an
unstructured or nonhierarchical, urban system. Throughout history, the existing metropoles and large cities formed a hierarchy
that expressed their status and power, as well as the status and
power of the nation-states or regions that they dominated.
Thus, no urban system or any part of it can be meaningfully
analyzed without taking into account its evolution and history.
The stability of urban hierarchies (particularly that of large
cities) throughout history is presented as being surprisingly
strong. For this reason, a relatively extensive part of the following paper is concerned with the history of the Central European
metropoles’ system. Because my knowledge of Prague is better
than that of any other Central European metropole, many comparisons are illustrated from the perspective of that city.
This paper is divided into four sections: (a) large cities in Central Europe and their interaction in the past, present, and future;
(b) linking the Central European metropoles to the Western
European urban system; (c) the effects of globalization processes
on Central European metropoles; and (d) the emergence of new
135
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disparities created by globalization inside the region and inside
the Central European states, including the benefits and costs of
globalization.
II. Large Central European Cities and their Interaction
in the Past, Present, and Future
In the present phase of the dramatic change in European political structure, the roles and interactions of the continent’s capitals are undergoing rapid alterations. Some of the
transformations are of a geopolitical nature, some are sociocultural, and still others pertain to the general features of traditional intercity interactions. The network of Central European
capitals — Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Warsaw, and Berlin — provides a good subject for the examination of these changes. In
addition, there are a number of practical reasons why Central
Europe, particularly the Czech Republic, should be carefully
observed.
Central Europe has always been a nerve center for Europe as
a whole; and in the near future, the organization of Central
Europe can have a positive or negative effect on the processes of
overall European integration. Bismarck’s famous maxim that
whoever reigns in Bohemia has the potential to rule the whole of
Europe does not apply to present-day European constellations.
There is no denying, however, that Bohemia is a small core area
in Europe where numerous wars have started and ended and
where various modalities in East–West relations have been
repeatedly tested.
In the emerging New Europe, conceived as a kind of confederation, Prague might shed its postwar peripheral position and
become part of a new dynamically growing region. Another
possibility, however, is that the shift from a centrally planned
economy to a market economy might plunge it into a lengthy
recession.
There are some intellectually intriguing questions that legitimate the quest for a greater understanding of the new forms of
intercity interaction. At this point, I propose that we rediscover
and reinterpret some of the concepts first formulated by the
fathers of human ecology at the University of Chicago.1 They
developed the concept of symbiotic competition that can be
136
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used, it seems, not only for analyzing intra-urban processes but
also for improving our understanding of the interactions among
cities.
Another intriguing question is the continuity and discontinuity of regional patterns of linkages among cities and the positions of cities in the urban rank order. To what extent is the
power of a city stable? To what extent does it change? If it
changes, how rapid can a change of this kind be?2
A. Before World War I
Any serious examination of the interaction between Prague and
the neighboring capitals in the Central Europe of the future
should be based on a historical perspective. The starting point
for a historical analysis should be the second half of the nineteenth century. Two paradoxically different events mark the
beginning of this period: the emergence of a unified German
Reich under Bismarck and the emancipation of Hungary within
the Hapsburg monarchy, which was an important step toward
the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.3
The regional status and hierarchy of the five cities after 1870 is
quite clear: Vienna and Berlin in very strong positions with a
gradual rise in the status of Berlin, Budapest with a medium and
rising status, and Prague and Warsaw in relatively low positions. Unlike the situation in some countries, where the capital
cities were not important industrial centers (e.g., Madrid, Rome,
and, to some extent, Paris), the economic and industrial functions of all the cities referred to above were well developed and
quite strong. The Central European capitals, particularly
Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw, were in their countries’ industrial islands, where industrialization processes had often started.
Prague was different in the respect that it was part of a larger
industrialized area, Central and Northern Bohemia.
The sociocultural roles of the capitals in question exhibit a different pattern. Vienna played an obviously dominant cultural
role in the empire as a whole, and its influence radiated to other
parts of Europe as well. Although Berlin’s position was less
important at the beginning of this period, it improved rapidly
alongside the growing economic and political power of the German Reich. Budapest and Prague both played a less significant
137
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sociocultural role. Budapest was the ethnic center for Hungarians, and Prague was the cultural center not only for Czechs but,
to some extent, for Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs as well.
The weakest position was that of Warsaw, which not only suffered from the division of Poland into the three parts but was
also confronted with stiff competition from Kraków, another
important Polish cultural center. One should also not forget that
during the time of Poland’s partition, Warsaw was a mere
regional center of the Russian part of Poland.
The kind of division of labor that played a role between Glasgow and Edinburgh or Rome and Milan was virtually nonexistent in the Czech region. Prague was a regional cultural,
industrial, and political center all in one. Brno and Ostrava, the
two potential competitors, were predominantly industrial cities
at the time without any considerable cultural influence.4
The interaction among the five cities at the start of the twentieth century mainly consisted of symbiotic economic competition
and political rivalry based on growing nationalism. A great deal
has been written about the economic competition between
Vienna and Berlin5 and about the political rivalry between
Prague and Vienna.6
This period was marked by intensive trade as well as extensive cultural and social contacts. It was a period of great technological advances that did much to improve human interaction; it
was a period of flourishing railways, telegraph and telephone
systems, and European integration processes. It was also an era
of intensive intercity competition and of great fears on the part
of cities not in the top ranks that they would be reduced to
provincial towns. The nervous anxiety of Prague, Salzburg,
Dresden, and Kraków was notorious in this respect.
The large cities were an integral part of the growing tendency
toward nationalistic particularism, although, surprisingly
enough, this was also the period when the Mitteleuropa idea
began to take root.7 However, the fragmentation processes continued, particularly in the political and cultural spheres. Due to
the existing political and economic structures, most importantly
the predominance of conservative feudal-aristocratic policies in
the Central European states, nationalistic differences predominated. The technological changes and economic developments
that were to lead to the integration of Europe were taking place
138
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at precisely the same time. The disparity between these two
processes was tragic. The potential of this region prior to World
War I was not developed.
It should be noted that social interaction among the large
cities was confined to contact among their respective economic
and political elite groups.8 Personal contact in the fields of science or literature was far less intensive and frequently took
place by way of letters. The role of journals and books was, however, rather important at that time. Books published in German
were read in Vienna as well as in Berlin and Kraków. There was
no mass tourism on the part of the middle and lower classes.
They still spent their holidays in their own countries. Compared
to today, there were very few conferences where academics of
various countries could meet and exchange ideas.
In short, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth were characterized by a combination of fragmentation and cooperation. To a certain extent, this combination
can be described as symbiotic competition. The integrating
processes furthered some of the features of a common Central
European culture that extended to include not only the AustroHungarian Empire but Germans as well.9 This was most vividly
apparent when the region was compared with Western Europe.
The cultural similarities of Central Europe could be explained
sociologically. In most of the countries of Central Europe, even
Germany,10 there was a feeling of backwardness in comparison
with Great Britain and France. Efforts to catch up with the civilization of Western Europe constituted an important factor in
the social changes taking place in the region. The specific position of intellectuals in Central Europe played an important role
in this respect.
Without losing sight of the general picture of Central Europe,
we should also focus on the considerable cultural differences
between the five major cities there. Each of them had a different
relationship with the West. The difference between Vienna and
Berlin was the most illustrative in this respect.
B. The Interwar Period
It has often been claimed, and rightly so, that World War I was
one of the most disastrous events in European history and that
139
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World War II was a continuation of that calamity. One of the
consequences of WWI was the deepening of the prewar fragmentation. Cultural and national differences were projected
onto political and economic ones. Three old empires — the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czarist Russia, and the Ottoman Empire
— all collapsed. Numerous new national states emerged. Some
of their founders were of the opinion that this meant the victory
of democracy over theocracy.11
If we examine the capitals of Central Europe, it is clear how
they differed in the interwar period. They were either part of the
victorious or of the defeated nations. Prewar animosities were
reinforced by this fact: Prague versus Vienna, Prague versus
Budapest, Warsaw versus Moscow. Old markets crumbled, and
some of the nations and cities had to radically redirect the focus
of their markets as well as their general economic policies on
foreign trade.12 Of course, the war also destroyed the traditional
commercial links among the five cities, which were slowly
rebuilt in the subsequent period.
The cities of the victorious nations, particularly Prague and,
to a lesser extent, Warsaw, began to focus politically and culturally on their Western allies; and the Czechs stressed their liberal
democratic orientation. For Prague, the models were France, the
United States, and Great Britain. With regard to the Czech interwar developments in the social sciences, literature, and architecture, there is a great deal of documentation to support this
thesis.13 The history of Prague’s avant-garde architecture in the
twenties and thirties is one of the most interesting examples.14
During the interwar period, the five cities also exhibited considerable differences in their growth patterns. These patterns
might be classified into three categories: (1) rapid growth, e.g.,
Prague and Warsaw; (2) slow recovery and slow growth, e.g.,
Berlin and Budapest; and (3) stagnation and, to a certain extent,
decay, e.g., Vienna.15
The precarious interwar equilibrium did not reduce the
fragmentation of Central Europe, and the prewar symbiotic
competition was weakened. Improved transportation and communication technology and economic internationalization only
served to make the basic inconsistency of the interwar arrangements even more obvious. Multinationals were already in existence at the time. The interconnectedness of Western and
140
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Central European cities was continuously eroded by political
rivalries based on narrow-minded national interests. Nonetheless, there were many people in Central
Europe, mainly in the
v
1930s (Coudenhove-Calergi, Karel Capek, Kurt Tucholsky, and
Max Brod, to name just a few) who devoted themselves to the
struggle for European universalism and understanding. Efforts
to bring together Czechs and Germans were also made, as
expressed in the writings of President Masaryk, the philosopher
Rádl, and others.16
How were all of these complex processes reflected in the concrete positions of the five capitals referred to above? In the late
1930s, Prague became a modern European metropolis. Its residents, however, were plagued by deep feelings of uncertainty
and insecurity. Vienna struggled along from one crisis to
another, losing its population—particularly its intellectuals—its
spirit, and its economic prosperity. Budapest slowly came back
to life and, in the late 1930s, exhibited a relative rise in its economic and cultural output. After a brief, gloomy postwar
period, Berlin stabilized its economic power in the 1920s and
became one of the most flourishing cultural centers in Europe.
This came to an end, however, with Hitler’s ascension to power.
In the 1930s, Berlin became a capital preparing to reconquer lost
positions of power. Warsaw slowly built up its position in the
Polish macroregion, all the while competing closely with
Kraków. Compared with the prewar period, its status
improved.
In order to explain some of the lesser-known aspects of
Prague’s development, I would like to say something more
about it in the interwar period. To quote Ferdinand Peroutka,
the leading Czech journalist at the time, the energy of the population was, to a large extent, concentrated on building a state.17
The unresolved problems of the German minority in Czechoslovakia also had a negative impact on life in Prague. Compared
with the other Central European capitals, Prague retained certain important liberal features: it functioned much as Vienna did
in the period after 1955, as a refuge for political emigrants18 and
as a place where the Jewish students refused in Hungary,
Poland, and Austria could register at the university. Last but not
least, Prague was to remain the one and only democratic capital
in Central Europe almost until the outbreak of World War II.
141
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C. Post–World War II
Compared to the situation following WWI, the post-World War
II period introduced a number of radically new patterns to the
relations among the five cities.
Europe was soon divided into two blocks, and two of the
cities in question were divided as well. This time, the war
caused extensive damage to most of the cities. Warsaw was
almost completely destroyed, as were parts of Budapest and
Vienna, as well as Berlin to a great extent. The only city to
escape almost intact was Prague. These war events had a much
greater effect on the civilian populations than did those of
World War I, and they led to far greater social changes and disruptions.
The division of Europe not only meant a political separation;
it also gave rise to differing regional processes. In the socialist
countries, the capital cities and their growth were more strictly
checked by the state than in the liberal democracies. In fact, antiurban policies were introduced. Due to this check, Prague, for
example, now has approximately the same population as in 1940
(1,050,000 in 1940 and 1,211,000 in 1980).
Although history did repeat itself in a way by placing Prague
and Warsaw once again on the side of the victors with Berlin,
Vienna, and Budapest on the side of the defeated, this fact was
soon to lose whatever significance it might have had.
The five cities became the capitals of nations that had undergone considerable changes. The most radical change had taken
place in Germany, where part of Berlin became the capital of
only one part of the divided country. Warsaw was suddenly
near the eastern border of Poland, since the entire country had
been shifted westward. Prague ceased to be the capital of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Discounting the war period, the fewest
changes of this type were observed in Hungary and Austria.
In those parts of the macroregion that were allotted by the
Yalta Conference to the Soviet Union’s sphere of power, the
most striking changes occurred in the sociopolitical and economic systems. These changes played a decisive role in determining the status of the capitals. Soviet-style central planning
suppressed the growth of large cities, especially of capitals.
Strict checks were enforced in Prague and Warsaw and, to a
142
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lesser degree, in Budapest as well. The consequence of these
policies was obvious, as these cities lost their positions in the
hierarchy of European cities. Particularly in the 1950s and 1960s,
the macroregional policies combined with the economic autarkic policies to eliminate the traditionally intensive multilateral
interaction among Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, and Warsaw was replaced by bilateral linkages to Moscow.
The situation slowly improved in the late 1960s. There was
more and more contact among scientists, artists, and writers
from Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and East Berlin. Tourism also
expanded. In comparison with what was happening at the time
in the West, however, this interaction was still negligible.
According to Enyedi, the most dramatic changes pertained to
the position of Berlin.19 The Soviet section of the city became the
capital of the German Democratic Republic. East Berlin was to
control an industrialized and developed country, albeit a small
one, while West Berlin remained an enclave without any direct
attraction zone. It has, however, exhibited remarkable cultural
development, to a certain extent affecting Vienna and Budapest.
During the course of this period, there were frequent changes
regarding the relations between Budapest and Prague. After the
war, relations were uneasy and often almost hostile. They began
to improve in the 1950s, and the events of 1968 did much to
enhance them even more. From then on, they continued to gain
in strength, particularly in the unofficial sphere, but to a certain
degree in the official sphere as well.
Even though a considerable segment of the Viennese population was of Czech extraction, relations between Vienna and
Prague remained lukewarm virtually throughout the postwar
period. For a long time, both Prague and Warsaw were cut off
from Vienna, with less contact than at any other time in the history of Central Europe. Vienna completely forfeited its position
as leading metropolis of the area. This separation of Vienna
from its international hinterland in the first few decades after
World War II was one of the most striking phenomena in the
region.
Although it had a better starting position than Vienna, Prague
declined into a provincial city during this period. It never made
any effort to become a junction between East and West, a gateway from Western Europe to the USSR or the Balkans. In the
143
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new context, its position resembled that of the pre-1918 period.
Soviet strategic considerations undoubtedly played a role in this
connection. Prague was the westernmost capital, a city inside a
region (Bohemia) that was slowly but surely losing its industrial
and cultural significance. This trend came to an end in the 1980s.
The COMECON planning policies were responsible for the
dwindling and even the disappearance of some important
industrial activities in the individual capitals. Prague lost its
optical industry and, to a large extent, its electrotechnical and
some consumer goods industries. They were replaced by industrial activities — steelworks in Warsaw, the manufacture of
trams in Prague, and buses in Budapest — that did little to benefit the capitals themselves.
In this third period, Vienna was the only capital to become a
major international transport center. Its airport served as a gateway to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Balkans. It
also took over Prague’s prewar role as a transit place for political refugees. In his book Porträt Europas,20 Salvator De
Madariaga rightly noted that Vienna was the hidden capital of
Europe, since it was where East met West. By examining Berlin
in this period, one can see that it lost its traditional position.
Even financial injections from the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) could not stop its long-term decline from its macroregional position.
In the final stages of Real Socialism, all the Socialist capitals
began to compete for the favor of the West. Budapest and Warsaw were the most successful in this respect, followed by Prague
and East Berlin. The principle of symbiotic competition once
again came into effect but under new conditions. It was not
merely a return to the conditions of the late nineteenth century.
D. Present and Future Developments
What will shape the role and power of cities in postindustrial
society? The term itself indicates that there will not be the same
kind of industry as in the nineteenth century. Opportunities for
growth will depend on computer technology, science, culture,
and services to bring people together, principally in interregional and international capacities. Whether competing for
deindustrialization or for new industries, cities will be rivals
144
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with respect to the quality of the environment, attractive architecture, cultural and sporting events (e.g., the Olympic Games),
freedom of information, quality of education, intellectual creativity, and the internalization of culture. Last but not least,
cities will be competitors in regards to the quality of life, particularly the quality of human relations.
Aside from Vienna, from where will the other four capitals
begin? Due to Soviet “unification” of the region, current competition among these cities is, paradoxically, not very strong. However, it is quite possible that old rivalries and even antagonisms
will soon reappear. The most important question today is
whether the conditions can be created for new and less hostile
forms of rivalry and competition without reverting back to the
conflicts that plagued Eastern and Central Europe in the past.
With respect to the basic position of the five capitals, the following major patterns might emerge. In the not too distant
future, Berlin will have the highest status in the area. Within two
decades, it will be on a level with Paris and London. However,
since the FRG is a federation, there may be some jealousy on the
part of Bonn, Munich, Hamburg, and perhaps the cities of the
Ruhr. There also might be obstructions from other countries,
and, of course, the formation of a new capital will take time.
The change will probably have a detrimental effect on Vienna.
In the past few decades, large amounts of German capital have
flowed into Austria, but in the future, it will be channeled to the
entire area of the former German Democratic Republic and, of
course, to Berlin itself. Nonetheless, Vienna’s position is so
strong that, although this might slow down its development, it
will not stop it. Vienna will remain the site of international agencies and the gateway to the southeast of Europe. As a trade center, it can attract people from nearby regions in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary.
However, the high cost of living in Vienna, due to the presence of the international agencies, will make it impossible for
many of the people who use it as a regional center to permanently settle there. Moreover, there will be a westward shift of
economic and commercial activities inside the country toward
Salzburg and the Tyrol. But not to be overlooked is one of
Vienna’s principal advantages: it is the capital of a neutral country.
145
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Budapest can benefit from its proximity to Vienna. Although
it may never attain the economic importance of Vienna, it can
certainly compete as a site for international conferences and
meetings. Its strength lies in its intellectual potential and creativity. Budapest’s main drawback, however, is its relatively small
regional hinterland. It is still a large city in a small country,
though it is skillfully striving for a better position in the wider
urban network. Thanks to the efforts of Hungarians living
abroad, Budapest will soon house affiliated branches of various
U.S. universities.
The great future potential of Warsaw is largely based on its
role in a large country. Although Warsaw is half the size of
Budapest, it is in a country that today has one of the most ethnically homogeneous populations in Central Europe. As the economic conditions in Poland improve, it will undoubtedly
witness rapid growth. The traditional competition with Kraków
will probably be relatively unimportant. Warsaw can begin to
function as a macroregional center of the northeastern part of
Central Europe, and perhaps it can also serve the emerging
Baltic republics. It may, however, be threatened not only by
Prague and Berlin but by Budapest as well.
Prague is a latecomer. Its position is more complicated; however, there might be some advantages to this. Its position will
also be precarious because of its geography. Between up-andcoming Berlin and the three-city agglomeration of Vienna,
Budapest, and Bratislava, it will not be easy for Prague to establish a role for itself that is not confined to mezzo-regional functions. Will Prague have a chance to become anything more than
the capital of the Czech Republic? According to the central place
model, the prospects are, indeed, quite poor; but there is also the
more realistic network model based on the interaction among
centers all around the world. As a result of modern communication technology, this model presents a more optimistic outlook
for the future of Prague.
From a purely regional perspective, Prague is in danger of
becoming solely a regional center for the Czech Republic, which
has a total population of ten million. The advantage in comparison with the prewar period is that it is ethnically quite homogeneous. However, the emergence of regionalism in Moravia and
Silesia are examples of new centrifugal forces. These regions
146
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began to strengthen their position with new universities and
other institutions. The regions were reinforced by the fact that
they — together with western Slovakia — were part of the most
dynamically growing areas in the Czechoslovak Republic in the
postwar period. The other positive point about the Moravian
macroregion is that it is one of the oldest and most advantageous North–South axes, connecting Warsaw with Vienna,
Berlin with Vienna, and so forth. Compared with this, Prague
was never part of the important European communication network. It is a remote place. No wonder Leontes had so much
trouble with the location of Bohemia in The Winter’s Tale by
Shakespeare: “Where is Bohemia? Speak! Bohemia. A desert
country near the sea.”21
Prague’s regional position is also endangered by its eccentric
position inside the state. Its peripheral location has long been
responsible for its provincialness and stagnation. Prague’s
prospects would be far better if it were in the heart of a region.
But is this feasible? And if so, which region? In the current situation, Prague is in a region that is gradually becoming depopulated, a region twice subjected to radical industrial conversion in
the past century. The first occurred after World War I when the
decaying textile industry was replaced by machinery industries,
and then again following World War II when the Stalinist iron
option was followed by a recession in the machine industry,
engineering, and heavy industry in such cities as Plzen and
Kladno.
In addition to these changes within the Czech Republic, the
growing economic strength of Slovakia led to Slovak dreams of
independence and a true Slovak Republic. These factors will
undoubtedly stimulate another wave of Bratislavan growth.
This discussion can be summarized quite simply: certain
endogenous regional forces will lead to the quantitative growth
of the city of Prague. These factors include the removal of artificial planning barriers to growth, the increase in the number of
students, the increase in the number of visitors from the rest of
the country and abroad, and the growth of the service sector.
However, all of this can do little to alter the secondary position
of Prague. In a rapidly changing Europe, greater quantitative
growth is not enough. Neither Prague’s size nor its regional role
will be sufficient to play a decisive role in securing a better posi147
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tion in Central Europe. If we accept James Vance’s theory of network systems,22 as opposed to central place systems, then
Prague’s chances — and those of Budapest and Warsaw as well
— depend on the qualitative input of their cultural role. This
brings us to the social and cultural problems, interaction patterns, division of labor, and exchange and specificity of each
individual city.
III. Linking Central East European Metropoles to
Western European Metropoles and to the Western
European Urban System and Globalization Processes
The most important mechanisms of globalization in Central and
Eastern Europe include the formation of new and stronger linkages between East Central European metropoles — i.e., the core
areas of economic, social, and cultural transformation — and the
existing urban system in Western Europe. To better understand
the role of large cities in the processes of globalization and in the
deep reunification of Western and Central Europe, two perspectives need to be explored separately: (1) the probable future
developments of the Western European urban system and (2)
the probable trends in the regional and urban systems in Eastern
Central Europe.
A. Urban Futures in Western Europe
Recent studies on the future spatial organization of Western
Europe23 describe three key scenarios: growth, equity, and environment. The polarities among these scenarios are based on economic growth and the reduction of social and spatial disparities.
In the given political situation in Western Europe, taking into
account the orientation and strength of the most important political parties, the growth scenario is the most likely. In some countries with strong social democrats, it will be, however,
supplemented by elements that come from equity and environmental scenarios. But even in countries with strong conservative
parties, some environmental and equity scenarios will be
included in urban and regional futures.
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The following are the key elements of the growth scenario:24
Population — low birth rates; aging society; growth-financed
social security; immigration of non-European Union foreign
labor; relative stability in population size.
Lifestyles — small households; growing number of singles;
fewer traditional families; stress on efficiency, mobility,
telecommunication, and consumption; division of the society
into “successful and affluent” and “less able and relatively
deprived.”
Economy — economic growth based on the formation of a
larger European common market; technological innovations;
relatively decreasing welfare expenditures of the individual
states; growing income disparities between European growth
areas and peripheries and within European countries; lasting
disparities between Western and Eastern Europe.
Transport — increase in mobility of people; increase in freight
transport; dominance of transport on motorways; dominance
of individual automobility; further decline of rail freight service; local public transport declining; competition between
car, high-speed rail, and airlines.
Communication — massive use of fiber optics and satellite
communications; growth of “information city” lifestyles, jobs,
and interaction forms; growth of psychological stress due to
overcommunication; reinforced dominance of growth regions
and of large cities.
Culture and Knowledge — capital cities and other large cities
becoming “knowledge centers,” storing knowledge as well as
producing and “exporting” it; role of culture reinforced combining culture with other urban activities; “culture and economy could contribute synergetically to the knowledge base of
cities.”25
Regional and Urban Development — further concentration of
economic activities in the existing growth belts; severe
agglomeration diseconomies; economic and population
decline in peripheral regions; expansion of metropolitan
areas; formation of new functional divisions within metropoles (centers: information, power, and finance; suburbs:
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manufacturing); housing of families outside cities; disappearance of the traditional countryside.
The combined effects of all the predicted changes in economy,
population, lifestyles, transport, and communication, as well as
in the role of culture, can be summarized for the purpose of this
paper in the following way.
The changes described by the growth scenario would result in
a further spatial concentration of economic activities, people,
housing, and infrastructure into the already existing growth
regions of Western Europe, i.e., mainly into the so-called Blue
Banana, into the European Sunbelt, and into a secondary growth
belt stretching from Paris through the Benelux countries, Northern Germany to Scandinavia. The Blue Banana, which was first
described in a report called RECLUS,26 stretches from Southeast
England across the Channel, through the Benelux countries,
Southwest Germany, and Switzerland to Lombardy. The European Sunbelt is a growth zone developing from Venice to Liguria, then along the Mediterranean down to Barcelona and
Valencia. The Blue Banana and the secondary zone (ParisCopenhagen) are already now served by the highest level
ground transport infrastructure and contain six of the largest
European airports as well as the principal financial centers and
European Union political centers. With a population of eighty
million, the Blue Banana zone forms a kind of European megalopolis similar to, but larger than, that formed by Boston and
Washington. Its functioning and further growth will be stimulated by the Channel Tunnel, Gotthard base tunnel in Switzerland, and the system of high-speed trains. The density of
existing motorways there is the greatest in Europe. There is no
doubt that it will be a belt where communication highways will
first be introduced. Due to growing trade, tourism, political
interaction, and perhaps to the integration of some postcommunist countries (such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) into NATO, the Blue Banana will spread its tentacles as far
as Berlin, Vienna, and possibly Prague. Thus, there is no doubt
that, to some extent, the West European urban system will be
partly extended by means of a kind of secondary urban zone to
the East. In the future, it will undoubtedly be influenced by the
“opening” of the East. The evidence of such effects can be seen
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in the regional and urban processes within Germany after reunification in 1990. At the same time, it should be explicitly stressed
that the impact of the existing West European spatial organization and of urban and regional structures on both the Eastern
metropoles, and on urban systems in general, is much stronger
than vice versa. The main impulses are undoubtedly coming
from the West, but their absorption and effectiveness will
depend also on some endogenous factors existing in the East.
Internationalization and globalization processes always have
external and internal aspects. The recent history of Central European postcommunist countries proves it quite strongly.
B. Changes in the Eastern Central European Regional and
Urban System after 1989
After almost six years of urban system transformations in
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, new patterns begin to be discernible. We can now see that the outcome
of the first stage of transforming Central European urban systems reflects the interaction of four factors:
1. The so-called local potential (i.e., local cultural, social, and
economic resources).
2. The strength, capacity, and dynamism of the individual countries’ economies. Under the specific conditions of transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy,
this refers mostly to the speed with which market elements
are substituted for the management of the economy by
administrative and political elements.
3. The ability of the metropoles to function as gateways to and
from the more developed regions of Europe.
4. The ability of the Eastern Central European metropoles to
function as integrators of a renewed network of large Central
European cities.
The local potential is often described as a compositum of
resources that function as (a) catalysts for innovation, (b) factors
making the control functions of cities more efficient, and (c) factors improving interaction with other cities, i.e., promotion of
contacts with the outside.
151

12/21/95 07:59 AM

1870mus2.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 2

The following resources are most often quoted27 as positive,
innovative, and interactive.
1. Advantageous geographic location, accessibility.
2. Diversified economic activities, sectorial mix.
3. Strong internal and external political roles (e.g., capital cities
of major industrial or financial groups, etc.).
4. Efficient urban infrastructure, principally transport and
communication infrastructure.
5. Social (i.e., human) potential, flexibility, readiness to accept
change, knowledge of languages, and intellectual openness.
6. Good technological, legal, marketing, and other services and
the existence of diversified scientific research.
7. Presence of strong cultural and intellectual traditions, rich
offer of cultural and intellectual activities.
8. Architectural qualities, genius loci.
9. Good quality of municipal administration and general political stability.
10. Good quality of housing, diversified forms of housing.
11. Easy access to educational, cultural, recreational, and leisure
facilities.
The knowledge available on urban dynamics shows that factors 4, 5, 7, 10, and 11 are most important for the innovative functions of cities; factors 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9 are decisive for enhancing
the control function of cities; and factors 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are key
for stimulating globalization processes.
Using the above criteria to rate the potential of three Central
European capitals, this is how they compare:
Innovative potential: 1. Budapest 2. Prague
3. Warsaw
Control function:
1. Budapest 2. Warsaw
3. Prague
Globalization:
1. Prague
2. Budapest 3. Warsaw
The qualitative estimates of the potentials of Budapest,
Prague, and Warsaw document that these three capitals differ to
some extent, with Budapest and Prague being rather similar and
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Warsaw having slightly weaker general developmental potential.
To some extent, the differing levels of the three categories of
potentials correspond to the different dynamism of the economic transition in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland
and also to the general economic, social, and cultural attractive
pull of the individual metropoles. In this respect, the differences
can also be indicated by the number of foreign visitors entering
individual countries and their capitals. The Czech Republic and
Prague have the highest numbers of foreign visitors; in 1994, the
country was visited by 100 million people, and it is estimated
that 40 to 50 million of them visited Prague.
The rather strong control potential of Budapest, which is
partly due to its relative “opening” in the 1980s, can nowadays
be documented by the data on the concentration of foreign firms
in the capital cities. According to a recent report by the European Commission,28 among the capitals of the three states considered, it is Budapest that, in 1991, had the highest number of
firms with foreign capital (56 percent) and volume of capital
(57.5 percent). The respective data for Prague is 49 and 15.4 percent and for Warsaw 32.6 and 39.4 percent. On the other hand,
Prague is emerging, more often than the other two capitals, as a
center for scientific, professional, artistic, musical, and other
meetings, festivals, and conferences. The recent data on the
number of hotel beds and on air transport support this observation. The number of hotel beds in Prague is growing faster than
in Budapest and Warsaw, and Prague now has more hotel beds
than Vienna and Munich. The data on the number of passengers
using the airports of Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw show that
Prague’s airport is the most frequently used. Prague’s airport is
now becoming the principal airport for the postcommunist
countries of Central Europe and is slowly beginning to compete
with the Vienna airport. The construction of a new terminal will
(quite substantially) expand its capacity from 5 – 7 million passengers per year to 10 – 12 million. After Moscow/Sheremetevo,
it is the largest airport in postcommunist Europe.
From all the available data on the changes after 1989, a new
pattern of division of labor between the Central European capital cities, including Vienna and Berlin, is slowly emerging. It is
also a pattern that can be described by the terms symbiotic com153
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petition or complementary cooperation and competition. These
relationships, which have begun to emerge, are, to some extent,
a return to the situation that existed before 1914.
What does all this mean in terms of the spatial pattern of the
Central European urban system? There are two main theories
about that future. The first assumes that some urban regions
within postcommunist Central Europe will become linked as
peripheral units to the Blue Banana belt. The Eastern parts are,
in any case, already expanding to the East, e.g., in Eastern
Bavaria (Nürnberg, Fürth, Passau). Some old, highly urbanized
industrial areas (e.g., Saxony and Thuringia) will be reunited
with the core growth zone running through western Germany.
The most eastern outposts of the main European urban growth
zone, they will profit from their geographical location as well as
from some other advantages (e.g., lower prices of land, smaller
sizes, skilled and relatively cheap labor, good intellectual infrastructure). This school of thought can be described as “peripheral development.”
The second theory stresses the possibility of a new parallel
zone of urban growth, a Central European twin to the Blue
Banana. This idea was presented by Polish and Czech geographers and can be expressed in the following way. The transformation processes that will enable the four Central European
countries to become parts of the European economy, culture,
and society are concentrated in a boomerang. The boomerang is
located roughly between Gdań
sk, Poznan, Wrocaw, Prague,
Brno, Vienna, Bratislava, and Budapest; and it will most probably expand to the West to include Berlin. According to one of the
studies published by the European Commission, “Two Southern
parts of this ‘boomerang’ have real chances to become the truly
European centers: the region of Prague and the triangle composed of Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest. The Slovak-Hungarian
part of this triangle already attracts important foreign capital
that flows into Central Europe, and the location advantages of
this region have been evaluated as extremely favorable even on
the whole-continental scale. Further extension of the Prague
region westward is very probable, since the construction of
motorways connecting Prague with Southern Germany and
Berlin will bring multiplier effects and will create favorable con-
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ditions for economic expansion. It will allow for the full integration of Prague into the system of European metropoles.”29
In ten to fifteen years, both of these regions can become urban
growth areas with a status similar to that of Hamburg,
Barcelona, or Turin. At that time, they will be fully integrated
into the network of European international institutions and, at
the same time, will perform the global function of being the
main global gateways to Eastern Europe, accompanied of course
by the Berlin metropolitan region.
The two theories do not exclude one another. One can interpret them as two phases in the globalization processes linked to
the transformation occurring in Central Europe. In the first, the
growth zones are linked as a peripheral outpost to the main
European urban system; in the second phase, they begin to form
a new secondary urban growth zone. To some extent such
development will be a return to the developmental trajectories
started in the nineteenth century.
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